Abstract. The processes in the nancial markets in the last years revealed the new research directions in the risk for market actors valuation area. Globalization processes and their impact on a country's nancial system stability affects banking system not only with the clear macroeconomic indicators, but also with the panic and uncertainty of resources providers -depositors. Deposit coverage insurance limit increase as risk management tool for Baltic States banking system stability in the period of 2005-2009 was implemented. These actions helped commercial banks, participating in deposit insurance system, to keep their credit ratings and nancial stability. However, the main concern is about whether this tool is more theoretical or practical for maintaining stability of the banking system, and what in uence to macroeconomic factors make deposits sum in country's banks.
Introduction
During the recent decades the economic and nancial systems of the whole world became very dependent on one another. The processes in the nancial markets affected both the national economies of countries and the behaviour of individual investors and savers by creating new types of risks for market actors. Due to these reasons the world nancial markets and changes in them manifested through globalization processes and in uencing the stability of the nancial system of a country have become the object of scienti c research during the last decade. The importance of nancial crises and their in uence on the economies of the countries, stability of the nancial sector, highlighting the role of banks, is proved by scienti c research not only in the world (Drehmann 2002; Hoque 2009; Laeven, Valencia 2008; Ingves, Lind 1996; Ucal et al. 2010; Dahlheim, Nedersjo 1993; Viotti 2000 , Maysami, Lim 2004 Sabourin 2007; Kopcke 2000) , but also in Lithuania (Strumickas, Valanciene 2006; Macerinskiene, Ivaskeviciute 2008; Martinaityte 2008; Leika 2008; Lakstutiene, 2008 , Lakstutiene et al. 2006 Bogu-slauskas, Mileris 2009; Zukauskas, Neverauskas 2008) . Such research does not speak about the nancial security net which is necessary to reduce the risk of nancial crises. Santomero (1997) ; Aktan, Masood (2010) , Bernat (2009) ; Ince, Aktan (2009) ; Ginevicius, Podvezko (2008) ; Arslan, Karan (2009) ; Aluko (2007) states in his works that a nancial system would not exist without nancial institutions, which play the critical role in the economy: they not only support the expenditure of the private sector, but manage to nance part of the government's expenditure, and at the same time serve as an accumulator of savings providing the country with nancial resources. However, the nancial institutions may create instability in the nancial sector and the main reason for instability is the fact that the worth created by the nancial institutions is nanced by obligations, i.e. funds of depositors. Due to this reason, which is named by the majority of scientists (Bernat 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane 2002; Frolov 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Hoque 2007; Schich 2008) , almost all governments of the world created a security net for the nancial system, which would ensure stability and integrity of the nancial system. The proper nancial security net is necessary to reduce the risks during major nancial crises. Without the proper nancial security net any rumor about solvency or liquidity of a nancial institution may have a possibility to justify itself and become an absolutely exaggerated nancial crisis (Schich 2008) . Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) distinguish the following possible components of the security net: (1) 
explicitly de ned or unde ned deposit insurance, (2) regulation and supervision of bank activities, (3) the function of the central bank as the last creditor and (4) creation of procedures for bank bankruptcy decision.
Upon analyzing the components of the security net, other authors (Santomero 1997; Titarenko 2002; Hoque 2007; Schich 2008 ) narrow them down slightly, distinguishing only three main components of this net: (1) bank supervision system, (2) the function of the last creditor and (3) deposit insurance. Schich (2008) suggests a slightly wider concept of the nancial security net, indicating that by adding the function of mechanism of management of failures to the functions above it becomes possible to extend the scope of discussed problems. Scientists (Santomero 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Schich 2008) , analyzing the nancial security net, maintain that the elements of the nancial security net cannot exist separately: the individual components of the nancial security net are strongly interrelated. The foundation of any regulation structure is directed towards ensuring nancial stability, thus enabling the appearance of the element of insurance of a certain type of deposits, which is one of the important indicators of the stability of the banking sector.
Upon assessing the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system of the Baltic States, what is the main objective of this research, 4 targets could be set and they could help to answer the main question of the article, i.e. what in uence insurance of deposit has on stability of the banking system in case of the Baltic States: 1) to evaluate whether in a critical situation the government could provide guarantees that are declared; 2) to establish whether the increased government guarantees during one crisis can encourage banks and depositors to accept larger risks that could cause a new crisis; 3) to analyze whether introduction of different levels of protection could give rise to unfair competitive advantages among establishments accepting deposits; 4) to determine whether the increased limits of insurance of deposits cause moral risks if the insurance limits are not restricted.
Literature review
When discussing the elements of the nancial security net, the importance of the system of insurance of deposits does not raise any doubts. Santomero (1997) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) stress that the system of insurance of deposits strengthens the trust of the society of a country in the banking system. Taking into account the importance of the banking sector, together with its characteristic instability, the insurance of deposits creates a clear role of the security of the nancial system. The insurance protects or reduces the crisis-related losses of less competent depositors and may be seen as a part of a wide consumer protection program operating in many countries. And though the in uence of the insurance of deposits on the banking system has been discussed in scienti c literature for over fty years, it has to be noted that the subject is still on the level of deep theoretical discussions. Such discussions are encouraged by different attitudes towards the in uence of the insurance of deposits on the nancial sector. The supporters of insurance of deposits criticize authors (Kuritzkes et al. 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 2002; Hoque 2007; McCoy 2007) envisaging major risks to the banking system, when the stability of the system is supported by deposit insurance. The scientists supporting insurance of deposits (Santomero 1997; Diamond, Dybvig 2000; Taurait 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005) underline the fact that the main purpose of insurance of deposits is not to compensate the deposits to the depositors in case of bankruptcy of the bank but to support the stability of the whole nancial system, to reduce the probability of a nancial crisis. Different views on the system of insurance of deposits, performed empirical research, fragmented and repetitive scienti c studies determine the fact that scienti c sources present rather different evaluation of the in uence of the system of insurance of deposits; besides many of the studies analyze the situation of the last century, the in uence of the system of insurance of deposits on nancial crises that took place during 1980-1997. The last decade has seen many changes in the global nancial markets, which resulted in changes in the system of insurance of deposits, especially during the economic crisis that started in 2007. In the opinion of Laeven (2001) ; Garcia (2002); Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane (2002); Hoque (2007) , suitable evaluation of the system of insurance of deposits and correct reorientation at the necessary moment may essentially change the situation of the banking system and at the same time save the economy of the whole country. The events of the recent years force a different view on the system of insurance of deposits, it becomes necessary analyze new and relevant events in the nancial markets. Many countries had to quickly re-orientate the existing system of insurance of deposits in order to manage the nancial crisis. less care for depositors on the one hand and on the other hand, maintaining that insurance of deposits reduces the stimulus of depositors to control banks. Santomero (1997) ; Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane (2002) ; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) ; Schich (2008) point out the following problems of the insurance system as the main negative consequences of insurance of deposits: risk of moral damage, reduced stability of the banking system and increased probability of a banking crisis as well as reduced market discipline. Different authors distinguish moral risk as one of the main risks the system of insurance of deposits. It is stated that moral risk is most likely when the insurance of deposits is covered in nitely. Upon analyzing the negative effects of insurance of deposits, scientists (Santomero 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane 2002; Schich 2008 ) also suggest possible alternatives for reduction of such effects (Fig. 1 ).
There are instruments in the market allowing to reduce the negative effect of insurance of deposits on the banking system. In order to reduce the risk of moral damage, it is necessary to let the market discipline operate if the stability of the bank system decreases, it may be necessary to increase the limits of liability of bank management and increase the transparency of bank activity, if the probability of a banking crisis increases, management of deposit insurance should be transferred to the government level, if the market discipline is reduced, then it is necessary to change the model of nancing of the insurance of deposits.
Quite a few methods for solving problems of nancial stability have been created according to historical data they allow evaluating direct correlation between the key macroeconomic factors and certain risk measures, such as indicators of nancial stability.
Striving for more detailed analysis of the models of research of the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system, comparison of such models was carried out (see Table 1 ). Positive effects of deposit insurance system: the main tool in combating with panic of bank clients (depositors); a tool supporting the trust of depositors in financial institutions.
• • Negative effects of deposit insurance system: risk of moral damage; reduced stability of the bank system and increased probability of bank crisis; reduced market discipline.
• •
•

Stability of the banking system
Instruments for avoiding negative effects of insurance of deposits: allowing the operation of market discipline; increased liability of bank management, promotion of transparency of bank activity; management of deposit insurance system on the government level; changes to the model of financing deposit insurance.
• A clearly defined deposit insurance system. That is probably the only research found in of cial sources analyzing the deposit insurance system in the Baltic States.
Annual insurance fee rate; Maximum amount of insurance of deposits; Level of compensation; Obligation to participate; manner of administration of the deposit insurance system. Number of banks; Size of deposits; Share of demand deposits in relation to all deposits; Share of deposits from non-residents in relation to all deposits; Annual growth rate of deposits; Average annual interest for short-term deposits in the national currency and foreign currencies.
DemirgucKunt, Karacaoval, Laeven (2005); Static
In countries with different level of development insurance of deposits has a different influence on the stability of the banking system.
A clearly de ned deposit insurance system, all regions, all levels of development. The authors view the influence of the system of insurance of deposits from the point of view of different levels of development of countries. Insurance of deposits is analyzed in the context of the international deposit insurance system, distinguishing the factors that have an objective inuence on it as proved by empirical research.
Object of insurance; Currency of insured deposits; A system with the principle of joint insurance. Compensation; Fee rate according to risk; Obligation to participate; Financing of the system; Administration of the fund. GDP; GDP per capita. Deposits in local and foreign currencies; Size of deposits and interbank deposits; Total amount compensated to one depositor. A clearly defined deposit insurance system, less developed states. The performed research analyzes the correlation between different forms of the deposit insurance system and instability in the sphere of the banking system, paying special attention to less developed countries.
A clearly defined/undefined system; Limit of coverage of deposits; The correlation of the limit of coverage of deposits with GDP per capita; Sphere of application (foreign currencies/ interbank deposits); Joint insurance; Financing; Sources of nancing; Fees; Management; Membership. GDP growth rates; GDP per capita; Inflation; Real interest rate; Credit growth in the past; Foreign currency reserves; Trade growth rates; Devaluation.
Schich (2008); Dynamic
Suitable use of the deposit insurance system provides stability to the banking system.
A clearly de ned and undefined deposit insurance system. The author analyzed characteristics of the deposit insurance system and the in uence on the stability of the banking system in the face of a nancial crisis.
Limit of coverage; Financing of the system; Joint insurance.
Based on the comparison of different theoretical and empirical models, it can be stated that research models are directed towards support of different research solutions. While static research models (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Hoque 2007 ) are more oriented towards the factors in uencing the deposit insurance system and their interrelations, the dynamic research supporters (Taurait 2003; Schich 2008) highlight the consequences of the decisions of management of the deposit insurance system. The static models are more similar than different according to their structure, i.e. such models underline the factors in uencing the process, only the number of these factors variables of the system under analysis differ. The logical consistency of the static research methods provided on the in uence of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking system is easier to present than that of the dynamic methods (see Figure 2 ). From Figure 2 it is possible to note that three phases are characteristic to static methods. The rst and second phases are interrelated by feedback, and it means that the consequence in uences factors in uencing the deposit insurance system by feedback. When analyzing the static research methodss of the in uence of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking system and their logical consistency, it can be stated that these methods (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Hoque 2007 ) stress the correlation of determining factors and consequences, but it should also be noted that it is more of a re ection of the process of decisions of the static research End of Table 1 on the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system, which is attempted to correct in the dynamic methods. The drawback of the static methods is that these research methods analyze just the state of the system at a certain period and its in uence on the stability of the banking system without changing its parameters under certain economic conditions. The analyzed dynamic (Schich 2008 ) research method of the in uence of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking system highlights the changes of the system itself in maintaining the stability of the banking system. The author outlines the possible consequences to the nancial system of the country, after making certain key changes in the deposit insurance system. The following key internal changes to the deposit insurance system should be noted: changes to the limit of coverage of the insurance, changes to the nancing of the system, introduction of joint insurance. The said internal changes in the dynamic in uence research method are not only presented according to the importance but this model also presents the possible mistakes of such key changes that can have a totally different in uence on maintaining the stability of the banking system. The changes to the deposit insurance system analyzed in the dynamic research method of the in uence of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking system (Schich 2008) allow us to conclude that to achieve desirable in uence on the stability of the banking system the deposit insurance system should be reorganized effectively with changes in the world economy. Though the authors of static research methods (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Hoque 2007 ) focus more on tangible objective internal factors in their models, they also highlight the importance of macroeconomic factors, such as GDP growth rate, in ation, devaluation and others.
Summarizing literature review of the previous researches on the deposit insurance problems, could be stated that country speci c problems and macroeconomic environment changes can form a different character of the research. This can be in uenced by 
Research method
Based on analysis of scienti c literature, it can be stated that for further research it would be purposeful to combine the concepts of static (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005; Hoque 2007 ) and dynamic (Taurait 2003; Schich 2008 ) research models and to perform an assessment research on the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system in the Baltic States.
The recent world economic crisis affected the stability of the banking system governments of countries have started to create a security net for banks and other nancial establishments for strengthening this system. When creating this net, several elements of the security net were designed; one of them is insurance of deposits, its terms were reviewed in many states. The governments especially widened the existing guarantees and introduced new insurance limits, the majority of states increased the limits temporarily, several countries established them permanently. Thus the performed research on the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system in the Baltic States commences with identi cation of changes in a clearly de ned deposit insurance system.
In the performed research Schich (2008) underlined the possible consequences of extending the limits of insurance, which were not based on real facts. After 2008 and 2009, the consequences of increased insurance limits can already be evaluated based not only on theoretical provisions, but by analyzing real statistical data, evaluating the in uence of extending of these limits on the stability of the banking system of the Baltic States. The set targets in article introduction concerning the in uence of increased deposit insurance limits on the stability of the banking system will be analyzed using the adapted methods used by Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) , Hoque (2007) in their researches.
The research design can be listed in to 4 steps, encompassing targets of the paper: 1. To estimate country's government nancial guarantees; In order to achieve the rst target, we analyze the dynamics of the size of deposits and the funds accumulated in the deposit insurance fund and the possibilities of the deposit insurance fund to compensate the deposits in the banks. 2. To monitor, whether government guarantees encourage banks and depositors to accept larger risk; The second target is achieved by analyzing the credit rating of the banks of the Baltic States and shares in the Baltic market. The long-term credit ratings of the banks are interpreted on the basis of the rating values announced by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania. 3. To evaluate possible deposit insurance system introduction in uence to unfair competition amont deposits accepting institutions;
The third target of the article calls for a comparative analysis of deposit insurance systems employed by the Baltic country and branches of foreign banks, distinguishing the banks of the Baltic States not participating in the local country deposit insurance system. 4. To analyze the in uence of increased deposit insurance limit to moral risk;
When performing the analysis of the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system, the main indicator showing the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system is identi ed. Stability of the banking system is endangered when depositors start withdrawing deposits from banks because depositors lose trust in banks, therefore the main indicator showing the stability of the banking system is the size of deposits in the banks. The stability of the banking system is in uenced by the size of deposits in the banks and at the same time by macroeconomic factors, thus upon analyzing the in uence of insurance of deposits on the stability of the banking system, it is important to establish and distinguish the most important macroeconomic factors affecting the system. The analysis of the in uence of macroeconomic factors on the size of deposits in the banks covers the analysis of the control variables distinguished in the Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 
Results and ndings
European Union Directive 94/19/EC states that the member states may decide themselves whether the depositors have to accept a certain percentage of loss in case of bankruptcy of a bank. According to the directive, member states may limit the level of compensation of deposits to a speci ed percentage of deposits, which should be equal to or exceed 90% of aggregate deposits until the amount to be paid under the insurance reaches the minimum amount of compensation of deposits (i.e. 20.000 EUR). In other words the directive provides for a 10 per cent joint insurance possibility, i.e. European Union member states, which decide to apply the 10% joint insurance had to specify the minimum deposit compensation limit at 22.000 EUR.
In practice until changes in the EU deposit insurance market of 7 October 2008 the principle of joint insurance was supported by 12 EU member states -mostly the new EU member states (Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and others). Mostly, the countries applied 10 per cent joint insurance. In some cases the deposits not exceeding the limits of compensation of deposits were insured at 90%, however in other cases -in order to protect small depositors -the deposits were partially insured at 100% and partially at 90%. In the 7 October 2008 meeting the European Union Ministers of Finance unanimously decided to restore the con dence of people in the nancial sector and its proper functioning and for that purpose to take all the necessary measures to protect the savings of depositors. The decision of EU Council of Ministers of Finance of 7 October 2008 approved the increase of the limit of compensation of deposits to at least 50.000 EUR for at least one year. After this decision many EU member states decided to increase the limit of coverage of deposits even to 100.000 EUR. On 11 March 2009, the European Parliament and Council passed a new Directive 2009/14/EC amending Directive 94/19/EC on depositguarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay. This Directive establishes that by 31 December 2010 the amount of insurance should be not less than 100.000 EUR and the term for claims for insurance to be 20 businees days, which can be extended for 10 business days. Based on this Directive the majority of EU member states should increase the increased limits of coverage of deposits that are below the established limit once more to the required amount. Thus countries that had established lower deposit coverage limits will have to change the existing limits once more. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as other EU member states, increased the amount of coverage of deposits and amended other terms of insurance of deposits.
The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania increased the maximum coverage amount payable to deposits to 100.000 EUR from 1 November 2008 to 31 October 2009. According to the new procedure of insurance of deposits, in case of an insured event depositors will be compensated 100 per cent of the deposit -amount in litas equal to up to 100.000 EUR. From 21 July 2009 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania passed amendments under which the limit of coverage of deposits is set for an inde nite period of time.
On 16 October 2008 the Seimas of the Republic of Latvia increased the limit of insured deposits from the amount in lats equal to 20.000 EUR to 50.000 EUR, compensating 100 per cent of the deposit in one credit establishment. In Estonia in November 2008 the Law on Guarantee Fund was also amended and the limit of compensation increased to the amount in kroon equal to 50.000 EUR, compensating 100 per cent of the deposit in one credit establishment and cancelling the 10 per cent joint insurance.
Though the amount of deposits in banks in Lithuania is nearly two times less than in Latvia and 13 per cent bigger than in Estonia, the deposit insurance fund of Lithuania would be able to compensate more deposits in banks than the deposit insurance funds in Latvia or Estonia. The rst target of the research con rms that the deposit insurance funds of all three Baltic States would not be able to pay the compensations to depositors in case the banking sector of the country would experience a crisis caused by depositor panic and not one but several banks would go bankrupt. It can be concluded that insurance of deposits is more of a theoretical tool of maintaining the stability of the banking system than a practical one.
One of the main factors demonstrating reliability of banks is bank long-term credit rating announced by rating agencies. Based on the ratings assigned by Fitch Ratings, Moody's, S&P rating agencies the perspectives and risks of a bank can be judged.
The ratings of the largest (according to property) Baltic States banks and their perspectives according to Fitch Ratings rating agency are presented in Table 3 .
From the table above we can see that highest Fitch Ratings rating agency ratings are given to the largest Scandinavian capital banks. The long-term credit ratings of these banks are from A to A-(SEB A+) and though the rating perspective is negative, these ratings show that the banks are reliable creditors and deposit holders. However, according to the data of poll of depositors carried out by the Bank of Lithuania, depositors often choose the bank which pays higher interest rate and it is rare for a depositor to analyze the ability of the bank to payout the deposit.
According to the analysis of deposit market shares of the Baltic States' banks ( Fig. 3) , we can see that both in Lithuania as well as in Latvia and Estonia the largest deposit market shares are held by the banks that have high long-term credit ratings -AB SEB bank and AB Swedbank. However, in Lithuania AB DnB NORD bank, with high credit ratings, holds a smaller deposit market share (9 per cent) than bank Snoras (12 per cent), the long-term credit rating of which is much worse but the interest rate for deposits is much higher (see Table 3 ). The result of the set target shows that a rather large share of the market is held by the banks that offer higher interest rates and the long-term credit ratings and perspectives of which show the undertaken larger risk.
Not all banks operating in a country participate in the deposit insurance system, as the branches of foreign banks are not under obligation to participate in it, however, they have to insure the deposits at terms that are not worse than those of the banks participating in the deposit insurance system. But the danger of dishonest competition remains, as the local deposit insurance limits may be higher than the insurance limits applied by branches of foreign banks.
The banks and branches of foreign banks operating in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at the end of 2009 are presented in Table 4 .
The terms of insurance of deposits applied by the branches of foreign banks and the terms of the deposit insurance systems applied in Lithuania differ. The analysis of the terms of deposit insurance systems of Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian banks and the branches of the largest foreign banks operating in the Baltic States that publicly announce data about limits of deposit insurance evaluating the characteristics of the deposit insurance system (Table 1) is presented in Table 5 .
There should not remain the main difference between the compensated deposit amount from 31 December 2010 -it will amount to 100.000 EUR. All other branches of foreign banks operating in the Baltic States do not provide information about applied deposit insurance, and that can mislead depositors to expect the deposits to be insured by the insurance of the Deposit and obligation to investors of the Republic of Lithuania. Thus unfair competition actions can be seen in this respect, when a branch of a foreign bank can attract deposits easier under the cover of the insurance of deposits valid in the country. Such is the result of the third target research.
In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the new limit of coverage of deposits has an established limit (in Lithuania 100.000 EUR, in Latvia and Estonia 50.000 EUR) and although the limit of compensation is rather high, it is not inde nite. Thus it reduces the risk of moral damage underlined in the research of Schich (2008) . The in uence of increased limits of coverage of deposits on the stability of the banking system is best re ected by the changes of the size of deposits in banks (before the increase of the limit and after it).
The dynamics of the size of deposits in the banks of the Baltic States for [2007] [2008] [2009] in quarters are presented in Figure 4 .
The size of deposits in Latvia is biggest as compared to deposits in Lithuania and Estonia. However, with recession of the rate of growth of the world economy, the Foreign banks branches, not participating in deposit insurance system Lithuania size of deposits started to decrease as an indicator of declining situation. The limit of compensation of deposits was increased before signi cant recession of economies in the Baltic States therefore with the economy of the country reaching the "bottom" the size of deposits in the credit establishments of the country started growing. In Estonia, contrary to the situation in Lithuania and Latvia, both the economic situation and the changes to the size of deposits differ. The decrease in the size of deposits was in uenced by the amount of withdrawn deposits as a result of changes in the macroeconomic situation of the countries. Table 6 .
Sources of nancing
Bank and government
Management
Upon establishing the main links between the size of deposits in banks and the analyzed factors, it is possible to establish the statistical correlation between the size of deposits and the analyzed variables, applying the multiple linear regression model. Upon composing the multiple linear regression equation the independent variables, the value of the Student's test of which exceeded the limit of 5 per cent, would be rejected, i.e. in ation, trade growth rates, real interest rate and credit growth. Upon eliminating these independent variables, it is possible to compose the multiple linear regression models for independent variables with the biggest in uence on the size of deposits and to evaluate their reliability with respect to the Baltic States. The results of such mathematic modelling show that in the case of all three Baltic States there is only one common analyzed macroeconomic factor GDP per capita. The application of the smallest quadrant method for composition of regression equations produced the reliability indicators for the parameters and they are presented in Table 7 . In conclusion, we may state that the decrease of the size of deposits in Baltic banks was caused by unstable economic situation in the countries. The size of deposits was most affected by slower economic growth of the countries and declining situation of the residents of the countries as well as disturbances in the banking sector. Although the limit of coverage of deposits was increased to 100.000 EUR in Lithuania, and to 50.000 EUR in Latvia and Estonia, it did not stop the decrease of the size of deposits in banks, on the contrary, the sizes of deposits decreased further in the Baltic banks after the increase of the compensation limit. While the tendency of change of the size of deposits in the banks of the Baltic States is adequate to the economic situation of the countries, the risk of moral damage due to increased limit of coverage of deposits still remains (result of the fourth target of the research). When the economic situation of the country improves and the size of deposits in banks will no longer decrease, banks may accept growing activity risks due to especially high limit of coverage of deposits and the depositors may lose their guard.
Conclusions
The scientists carrying out research on the in uence of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking sector mostly analyze a clearly de ned deposit insurance system therefore discussions arise among scientists about the effect of a clearly de ned deposit insurance system on the stability of banks. The majority of scientists think that a clearly de ned system is optimal policy which maintains the stability of banks during depositor panic. However, insurance system nancial potential in the case of possible system failure is rarely analyzed.
The speci cs of the countries analyzed -The Baltic States, diverges rapid banking system and at the same time countries economic growth and sharp downfall over global economic recession. It de nes limited readiness of countries government and banking system for economy stagnation period, what forms additional issues supplementing earlier theoretical studies.
The research target 1 analysis of the ability of the Baltic States to compensate deposits in banks showed that the deposit insurance funds of all three Baltic States would not be able to pay compensations to depositors in the case of bankruptcy of a larger bank. The amount of deposits with large banks signi cantly exceeds the means in the deposit insurance funds. In case of bankruptcy of the smallest banks of the country, deposit insurance funds would be able to pay compensations to depositors, but after such payments there would be no money left in the deposit insurance funds.
The analysis of possibilities of accepting bigger risks by banks and depositors (target 2 of the research) showed that increase of the limit of coverage of deposits for an indenite period to 100.000 EUR in Lithuania, to 50.000 EUR in Latvia and Estonia reduces the guard of depositors and enables banks to accept higher risks. Though larger banks with the highest reliability ratings attract most of the deposits, a growing share of deposits goes to banks with lower ratings, which offer higher interest rates for deposits. This shows reduced guard of the depositors in choosing the bank.
Not all banks operating in the country participate in the deposit insurance system, as the branches of foreign banks are not under obligation to participate in the national deposit insurance system but have to insure the deposits at conditions not worse than the ones applied in the country of operation. However if a EU country has a higher deposit coverage amount, a branch of a bank from another EU state is not obligated to additionally insure the deposits, if the deposit insurance amount satis es the requirements set by EU. The research also shows that the majority of branches of foreign banks do not announce any information about the applied deposit coverage limit and it may mislead the depositor in choosing the bank (concluding research target 3). Though larger banks with the highest reliability ratings attract most of the deposits, a growing share of deposits goes to banks with lower ratings, which offer higher interest rates for deposits. This shows reduced guard of the depositors in choosing the bank.
The analysis of possible moral risks, corresponding to research target 4, showed that while the tendency of change of the size of deposits in the banks of the Baltic States is adequate to the economic situation of the countries, the risk of moral damage due to increased limit of coverage of deposits still remains. When the economic situation in the country stabilizes and the size of deposits in banks no longer decrease, banks may accept growing activity risks due to particularly high limit of coverage of deposits and the depositors may lose their guard. During a economic downfall residents should not experience moral threats, therefore the main task of deposit insurance is to restore the con dence of residents in the bank sector, guarantees can only serve as additional instruments of stabilization of the situation.
